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Credit first: the hosting is already in good shape. The server's at 1984 in Iceland, privacy-focused, free-speech-oriented, Monero-accepting, neutral jurisdiction. Domain's locked, registrant behind proxy. Where the data physically lives is handled well. (this credit didn't age well, did it, lol)
The domain is registered at GoDaddy (US) and the nameservers are GoDaddy's too (ns73/ns74.domaincontrol.com), so GoDaddy controls both the registration and the DNS. If they're ever compelled by a US court order or law-enforcement request, they can suspend the domain or null the DNS, and the Icelandic server just becomes unreachable by name; nobody can get to it via anonbazaar.com.
This isn't hypothetical, it's the single most-used takedown vector for sites like this. Look at Anna's Archive: the infrastructure survives fine, but the domains keep getting seized and the site vanishes for everyone until they scramble to a new one and re-propagate. Adversaries go after the domain precisely because it's the cheapest way to kill a site without touching a well-defended server. The domain is the highest-leverage, most-exposed layer, and right now it's sitting in US jurisdiction.
Two ways to improve it, and the team's best placed to weigh them:
**Option A, consolidate at 1984.** Simplest: registration, DNS, and hosting all under one aligned provider you already trust and pay in XMR. Fewer accounts to secure, one relationship, easiest to actually execute. Tradeoff: it concentrates everything at a single provider in a single jurisdiction, so 1984 itself becomes the one point that can take the whole stack down.
**Option B, split across two neutral providers.** Registrar at a specialized takedown-resistant outfit like Njalla (Sweden/Nevis, built specifically to hold domains on your behalf and resist exactly these requests, accepts Xmr. I am no expert on these, there might be better alternatives.), hosting stays at 1984. More robust for an adversarial threat model: no single company or jurisdiction controls the whole stack, and an adversary has to break two resistant providers in two countries instead of one. Tradeoffs: more operational surface (two accounts, two relationships), and Njalla's model means they legally hold the domain on your behalf, so you're trading direct ownership for takedown-resistance, which not everyone's comfortable with.
Both are large improvements over the current setup, where the front door sits entirely on the most-compliant US registrar. Option A is the fast clean win; Option B is the more decentralization-faithful, harder-to-take-down setup at the cost of a bit more complexity. The team knows the project's risk tolerance and bandwidth best, so the call's yours, but either move closes the US chokepoint.
Edited: Jun 8 06:16
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